Introduction
This paper is designed to outline how current methods in formal policy analysis have evolved to better respect limits to an analyst's knowledge. These limits are referred to as model uncertainty both in order to capture the idea that formal policy analysis is predicated on mathematically precise formulations that embody assumptions on the part of an analyst and because model uncertainty, which represents a recognition of the potential for these assumptions to produce unsound analyses, has been an active area of research in economics and statistics for the last 15 or so years.
The argumentation in this paper is not original and is admittedly selective. For Austrian economists, the paper will hopefully be of interest in indicating how empirical work is evolving in a way that better respects limits to a social scientist's knowledge. I certainly do not mean to suggest that these arguments should eliminate the objections that have been raised by some Austrian economists to formal empirical work. Rather, the intent of this paper is to indicate the possibility of dialog and debate between Austrian and non-Austrian economists on the role of formal empirical work. In several contexts, I
have introduced arguments concerning the limits of formal econometric analysis by Hayek and von Mises to both illustrate how the perspectives in this paper relate to their views in order to suggest why, in my judgment, some of their skepticism is unwarranted.
In focusing on policy analysis, I avoid issues of "explanation" per se. By this, I
mean that the focus in this paper is on the assessment of the distribution of socioeconomic outcomes of interest under alternative policies as opposed to questions of uncovering economic structure. Hence Hayek's (1964) criticism of statistics, "How little statistics can contribute, however, even in such cases to the explanation of complex phenomena is clearly seen if we imagine that computers were natural objects which we found in sufficiently large numbers and whose behavior we wanted to predict. It is clear that we could never succeed in this unless we possessed the mathematical knowledge built into the computers, that is, unless we knew the theory determining their structure. No amount of statistical information on the correlation between input and output would get us any nearer our aim…While statistics can successfully deal with complex phenomena where these are the elements of the population on which we have information, it can tell us nothing about the structure of these elements. " (p. 340) is only indirectly germane. Following Hayek's example, the question I am interested in is predicting the effects of a change in electricity supply on the output of the population of computers. There is no reason why the determination of this effect necessarily requires knowledge of the details of the power systems in individual machines. Hayek's critique is germane, however, if knowledge of the structure is required for policy projections. In this sense, application of Hayek's skepticism anticipates the LucasMarschak critique of macroeconomic policy analysis 1 In describing contemporaneous ways of addressing policy analyst ignorance I will examine three distinct levels.
, which amounts to arguing that knowledge of economic structure is needed to accurately predict the effects of policy changes because observed data have been generated under the current policy. In modern jargon, Hayek's critique is policy-relevant in the sense that it implies limits to the ability of an analyst to infer counterfactual scenarios from the data that have been observed.
First, I describe how econometrics methods can account for lack of prior knowledge of the correct statistical model. Specifically, I will describe model averaging methods which provide parameter estimates and descriptions of counterfactuals that explicitly account for ignorance of the correct statistical model. This discussion is conducted entirely using the tools of econometric analysis. While the language I employ is Bayesian, frequentist analogs of the approach I describe are available, see Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) . 2 Hence one does not need to take a stance on Bayesian versus frequentist approaches to statistics to employ this methodology. Lucas (1976); Marschak (1953) . 2 The former paper provides detailed discussion while the working paper version of the latter first proposed the frequentist approach to model averaging that has been adopted by a number of economists. It is not clear to me that there exists an Austrian perspective on the "correct" conception of probabilities, i.e. Bayesian or frequentist. An anonymous referee suggests that the Bayesian perspective seems more natural given Austrian emphases Second, I describe developments in statistical decision theory that allow for the comparison of policies when analyst ignorance is so extreme as to prevent model averaging to be feasible. This discussion will focus on cases where the possible values of unknowns such as the payoffs of a policy have well defined supports, but where probabilities cannot be assigned to these possible values. To be concrete, one can know that the support of a random variable is [ ] 0,1 yet at the same time not know which probabilities to assign to the Borel subsets of the interval. Economists now refer to environments in which probabilities are unavailable for uncertain outcomes as exhibiting "ambiguity" and have in turn developed a range of proposals for decision making in such contexts. 4 Third, I discuss the case of "radical uncertainty" in which payoffs to the policies cannot be determined given the ignorance of the policymaker. This case has received little attention in economics or in decision theory, as far as I know. It is easy to see that ignorance of the support of unknown objects can arise in important economic contexts.
One standard example involves technological change, where to say a technology is unknown presupposes one does not know its structure, let alone the space of possible structures for potential technologies that are not developed. Here I will argue that Austrian critiques, exemplified in Hayek (1964) , have particular force. While economic
The new literature on decision making in the presence of ambiguity has led to a particular interest in policies that are robust in the sense that they work relatively well regardless of the actual values of the unknown features of the socioeconomic system. on subjective as opposed to rational beliefs. Roger Koppl (private communication), on the other hand notes that von Mises (1966 pp. 106-115) seems to favor a frequentist conception. I am unqualified to adjudicate this issue. 4 In modern usage "ambiguity" corresponds to what Knight (1921) referred to as "uncertainty" while "uncertainty" corresponds to what Knight referred to as "risk". To further confuse matters, some economists refer to ambiguity as "Knightian uncertainty." Mainstream economists have largely ignored the role of ambiguity in Keynes' thinking on probability (Keynes (1921) ). Keynes (1936 chapter 12) , in the discussion of long term expectations, applies this difference in emphasizing the role of confidence versus formal probability notions in understanding behaviors whose payoffs involve the future. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing Keynes (1921) to my attention and Roger Koppl for suggesting to me the importance of Keynes' thinking on probability in chapter 12 of The General Theory.
theorists and decision theorists have been largely mute in discussing radical uncertainty (though to be clear this case has been discussed by Austrian economists), it has been the basis of a fair amount of work in philosophy. Gaus (2007) is of particular importance as he uses radical uncertainty concerning the effects of policies to argue against expedient policies and explicitly does this in providing a defense of Hayek's advocacy of principled policies. Here my main objective is to place this case on the table and acknowledge that the efforts by economists to better acknowledge ignorance in policy evaluation need to better address this case.
Econometrics
In this section, I discuss a first level of policymaker ignorance that I term model uncertainty, by which I refer to the long recognized yet fundamental problem that a researcher typically does not possess sufficient a priori knowledge to determine the correct statistical model to employ for analyzing a given question. I will, in this discussion assume the existence of a "true" model for the phenomenon of interest. In this respect, I do not address the Austrian critique of quantitative methods per se.
However, in discussing the lack of a priori knowledge of the true model, I hope that I will address some of the reasons why the general critique has been made.
The need for a statistical model to translate data into predictions of policy effects is, in the abstract, a banality as it means nothing deeper than that the data do not naturally speak for themselves. Further, it is very rarely the case that a social scientist assumes that he possesses the true model of a phenomenon of interest; it is standard operating procedure in empirical work to consider how deviations from a baseline model affect empirical claims. Authors routinely consider the effects of alternative control variable choices. That said, it is also a fair generalization to say that standard operating procedure in empirical economics treats model uncertainty in an ad hoc fashion. As a consequence, one often sees empirical literatures evolve because different researchers employ different statistical models. This evolution, however, does not lead to any resolution of the questions of interest because the use of different models produces contradictory results, with different authors arguing for the superiority of their particular models on either a priori or goodness of fit grounds.
A good example of how an empirical literature can degenerate into "dueling models" without resolution is the study of the effects of shall issue concealed weapon laws on crime rates. 48 states have now passed laws that in essence legalize the carrying of concealed weapons. The scholarly rationale for the laws is that crime will be reduced if potential criminals need to account for the possibility that their victims are armed.
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For my purposes, it is useful to contrast Lott and Mustard with Black and Nagin (1998) . If one compares Lott and Mustard (1997) , Black and Nagin (1998) and Lott's (1998) The claim that shall issue concealed weapons laws will reduce certain classes of crimes was first argued in a systematic econometric study in Lott and Mustard (1997) .
Lott and Mustard's study has, in turn generated a contentious literature, with different authors making claims for and against the proposition that shall issue laws are crime reducing.
For policy analysis, it is not sufficient, following Lott, to argue that "most" specifications favor the Lott and Mustard position that shall issue laws reduce crime.
The policy relevant question is what should be inferred from the available data and the 5 Popular debates have also focused on the potential of an armed bystander stopping a mass murderer, but this argument in my view is polemical rather than substantive. disparity of results across models. Nor is it sufficient to argue on a priori grounds the Lott and Mustard position on the two modeling issues that I have outlined is preferable to Black and Nagin as the issues do not reduce to substantive social science. For a policy analyst, the object of interest is the distribution of outcomes given a policy. The choice of statistical model is of no intrinsic interest. Hence, the assignment of probability 1, which is what model selection does, to a given statistical model out of a set of candidate models, understates the nature of the uncertainty facing the analyst, unless the analyst is in fact certain that the one model is correct. My argument is that quite generally, economists face model uncertainty when assessing policies and that this uncertainty needs to be respected when reporting the effects of policies.
As discussed in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) , model uncertainty occurs at several conceptually distinct levels. These different levels involve various dimensions along which one translates economic theory into a statistical model; while they may not be "natural kinds" these levels do seem to span many of the differences one sees across empirical papers.
First, in many contexts, economists simply disagree on the appropriate theoretical assumptions to employ. A good example of how different theoretical presumptions determine policy outcomes may be found in studies of the determinants of cross country growth, in which the empirical evidence that particular policies matter for growth has been shown to depend on which growth determinants appear in the regression, see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) for a survey of this literature and an indication of how fragile many growth claims have proven to be as their empirical salience appears or disappears depending on what additional growth determinants are considered. Brock and Durlauf (2001c) argue that growth economics is especially subject to theory uncertainty because growth theories are "openended" in the sense that the proposition that one factor affects long run economic growth typically has no logical bearing on the possibility that another factor affects growth. Hence for growth economics, a priori reasoning will not resolve theoretical disagreements.
In business cycle contexts, it is more natural for different theoretical models to exhibit logical inconsistencies in the sense that each model takes a particular stance on a substantive economic question. Alternative specifications of price setting cannot simultaneously occur. The recent financial crisis has led to a plethora of interpretations as to its origins and has led to challenges to the rational expectations assumption that is standard in macroeconomics.
Theory uncertainty is, in my view, an unappreciated issue in some Austrian economics contexts and sometimes leads to ex cathedra claims such as von Mises (1966) A third level of model uncertainty is exchangeability uncertainty. For a given data set, it may not be clear whether the observations on units (be they individuals or countries) may be treated as draws from a common statistical model. Brock and Durlauf (2001) show that this concern may be formally interpreted using DeFinetti's ideas on exchangeability of random variables, which formalize the idea that a researcher does not have a principled basis for assuming that one observation is generated by a different statistical model than another. For my purposes, what is important is that one can treat exchangeability uncertainty as a form of model uncertainty. In economic growth contexts, this means that one allows for distinct growth models to apply to different regions, or to economies in different states of development.
Exchangeability uncertainty is consistent with one of von Mises' criticisms of empirical economics:
"The late Henry Schultz devoted his research to the measurement of elasticities of demand for various commodities. Professor Paul Douglas has praised the outcome of Schultz's studies "a work as necessary to help make economics more or less exact science as was the determination of atomic weights for the development of chemistry." The truth is that Schultz never embarked upon the determination of the elasticity of demand for any commodity as such; the data he relied on were limited to certain geographical areas and historical periods. His results for a definite commodity, for instance, potatoes, do not refer to potatoes in general, but to potatoes in the United States from 1875 to 1929. They are at best, rather questionable and unsatisfactory contributions to various chapters of economic history." (p. 352) "If a statistician determines that a rise of 10 per cent in the supply of potatoes in Atlantis at a definite time was followed by a fall of 8 per cent in the price, he does not establish anything about what happened or what may happen with a change in the supply of potatoes in another country at another time. " (p. 55) This criticism can be interpreted as an exchangeability violation. The relevant empirical question is whether one can formulate a useful statistical model of a potato market which can account for differences in market equilibria between countries at different times. If one allows for arbitrary differences between the country-and time-specific markets, then the answer is no; but if the market differences can be structured so that, different location/time pairs of markets can be interpreted as realizations of a common statistical model, then the answer is, in principle, yes 6 How can model uncertainty be constructively addressed? Any answer, of course, is conditional on the nature of the model uncertainty that is permitted by the analyst. In this section, I introduce model uncertainty into a general policy prediction problem, but do so in a way that allows one to employ standard statistical arguments to account for its presence; see Doppelhofer (2008) and Onatski (2008) for recent literature surveys of the methods I describe.
. Notice that the latter requirement is virtually always invoked whenever data are analysed. My point is that different analysts can legitimately disagree on the question of whether certain observations obey a common model.
For example, for countries that are socioeconomically extremely similar to von Mises' Atlantis, his argument would not have equal force if it were the case that effects had in fact been similar in previous times.
That said, I fully agree with the import of von Mises' criticism; it represents one of the main defects of the modern empirical growth literature in the sense that far too little attention is given to the assumption that very different economies obey a common linear statistical model, see Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) for discussion of this problem.
Formally, define the following objects:
+1 t x = outcome that the analyst wishes to predict x given policy p . This conditional probability can in principle be visualized via a graph, in order to most easily communicate to a policymaker.
Of course, the conditional probability can be converted into a single number to communicate different aspects of the uncertain outcome. For example, the standard measure of the "best guess" of +1 t x is its conditional expected value given the data and the policy
where X denotes the support of possible values of +1 t x . Similarly, the standard measure of the uncertainty associated with this best guess is the conditional variance
One thing to keep in mind for statistics such as the conditional expectation and variance is that because each translates a function into a single number, much information is lost. Whether this information is of use to a policymaker, will depend on how he assesses different values of The natural solution is to preserve the logic that produced (1) while relaxing the a priori assumptions that were made. One considers what alternative sets of assumptions can coherently be combined to produce statistical models in order to construct a model space M , which contains those models an analyst believes should be considered when considering policy effects. Given a model space, one can construct analogs to (1) 
where ( ) Pr t m D is the probability that m is the correct model given the data. This term is essential in allowing the data to favor models that have better goodness of fit over others.
There is no algorithm for constructing a model space; this is where a researcher's judgment comes into play. The different sources of model uncertainty which have been described provide a template for generating a model space, but cannot determine the space. It is evident that substantive knowledge will apply to some and not others. An analyst may have strong prior beliefs about the social science theories that are to be employed. On the other hand, the specification of the form of a statistical model may not be well linked to social science reasoning. Notice that one can in principle construct versions of (1) that condition on particular substantive assumptions, and evaluate how the different levels of model uncertainty affect predictions given this conditioning.
How does model uncertainty alter the ways in which one thinks about statistical quantities? This question may be answered by considering the analogs of (2) and (3) that are produced by the conditional probability structure (4). Following Leamer (1978) 
respectively.
These formulas illustrate how model uncertainty affects a given parameter estimate. First, the model averaging mean of the parameter is a weighted average of the posterior means across each model. This is hardly surprising. Second and more interesting, the model averaged variance is the sum of two terms. The first term, 
where " ∝ " means "is proportional to".
The first term in (7) Pr m does conform to substantive prior knowledge to be the case where a social scientist assigns probability 1 to some subset of models that make common theoretical assumptions, whereas economic theory is sufficiently diffuse that such an assignment is inconsistent with the state of the economics discipline.
Example: The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment
To see how model uncertainty both has first order effects on empirical analysis and how an analyst can fruitfully address it, I focus on the question of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. What this means is that every coherent set of assumptions, using the assumptions in Dezhbakskh, Rubin, and Shepherd and Donohue and Wolfers as the set from which to choose, is defined as a separate model. A uniform prior is used for the model space.
Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin (2009) demonstrate that the Dezhbakskh, Rubin, and Shepherd and Donohue and Wolfers estimates are both ad hoc in the sense that they correspond to particular models that have no claim to be the correct one.
Once model uncertainty is accounted for, the variance associated with the deterrence effect of capital punishment proves to be an order of magnitude higher than the posterior expected value, which leads to the conclusion that whatever prior beliefs one has about the deterrent effect of the death penalty, the existing data are so uninformative that this prior belief should not be altered.
This finding is consistent with theories of deterrence; the death penalty can create incentives, for example, to execute witnesses.
Thus the disagreements derive from the use of different statistical models of the homicide process.
To be clear, model averaging is not a panacea for the problem of model uncertainty. The method requires that a researcher has sufficient prior knowledge that he can construct a space of candidate models which includes the correct model. To be fair, Donohue and Wolfers do not defend the 52 lives number per se, but rather use it to illustrate the fragility of the DRS findings to alternative assumptions.
approach is not sufficiently developed to allow for policy analysis.) It also requires that the model uncertainty be delimited in the sense that all of the candidate models are estimable. Hence model averaging will not be useful if one assumes a different set of parameters applies to each observation in a data set. That said, model averaging methods are valuable in that they provide a constructive way for a researcher to improve the quality of the reporting of empirical claims concerning policy effects by properly acknowledging dimensions of policymaker ignorance.
Decisionmaking without knowledge of probabilities
The discussion in Section 2 assumed that probabilities can be assigned to all possible values of +1 t x , conditional on a policy and a model. The availability of these probabilities is a prerequisite to the standard approach to decision theory under uncertainty. In classical or Bayesian decision theory, the probabilities described in Section 2 are combined with a payoff function ( )
which allows for expected payoff calculations of the form
Policy evaluation amounts to ranking different policies by (9).
In this section I relax the assumption that 
This means the data cannot distinguish between the two models. In such a case, the ratios of the posterior model weights will equal the ratio of the prior probabilities, 
The data, by assumption cannot differentiate the models, so any difference in the weights attached to the models will depend on the priors they are assigned. But this is precisely the sort of dogmatism that empirical analysts need to guard against . One solution to making decisions without probabilities is to guard against especially bad outcomes. This can be formalized by the principle of maximizing the minimum payoff of a policy choice. The maximin criterion was originally proposed by Wald; his (1950) book is a definitive description of his approach to statistical decision theory. The maximin approach is axiomatized by Schmeidler (1989,1991) 9 8
The discussion here is also relevant to the case where models are partially identified by the data, which means that there exist subsets of models whose likelihoods must be identical. Partial identification will hold if in addition to the models by Charles Manski; see Manski (2007) for an introduction to his work. Partial identification becomes of particular interest in many contexts because it emerges when an analyst restricts himself to weak assumptions on the data generating process.
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Gilboa and Schmeidler develop their theory on the assumption that agents maximize expected utility based upon subjective probabilities (formally known as capacities) that interestingly this is done from the perspective of a decision maker who does not have a unique prior from which to compute posterior probabilities. Hansen and Sargent (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic implications of decision making based on maximin resolution of ambiguity in the correct model of the economy.
A basic idea underlying the Hansen and Sargent work is that ambiguous environments should lead one to focus on robust choices, i.e. choices that work relatively well across elements of a model space. This contrasts with the search for optimal policies which impose much greater information requirements on the policymaker. Indeed, Hansen and Sargent is a nice example of how, in policy choice, the best can be the enemy of the good.
To understand the logic of maximin, suppose that a policymaker is comparing Maximin amounts to assuming the worst case scenario for each policy and choosing that policy that has the highest payoff under the worst case scenario. By this criterion, one chooses 1 p since its lowest expected payoff is 23 whereas for 2 p the lowest expected payoff is 15.
Is maximin always sensible? This is not clear. Consider a second expected payoff matrix do not obey the axioms of classical probability, in that the probabilities are subadditive over nonoverlapping events, and so need not sum to 1. Regret is defined for each pair of a model and a state of the world. For each state, the regret associated with a policy is the difference between the expected payoff generated by the best policy, for that state of the world, and the expected payoff of that policy. In the second expected payoff matrix for model 1 m , the regret associated with 1 p is 79, since this is the loss in expected payoffs involved in choosing 1 p versus 2 p if 1 m is the correct model. In contrast, the regret for 1 p given 2 m is 0 since 1 p is the optimal policy for that model. In contrast, the regret for 2 p given 2 m is 2. Minimax regret is a criterion that says choose the policy whose maximum regret is smallest. This leads to the choice 2 p for this example, which is intuitively appealing. Savage (1961) As originally recognized by Chernoff (1954) , minimax regret exhibits a property that is troubling to many economists and decision theorists. To understand the issue, consider the following example of minimax regret decisionmaking with two policies and two models. Hurwicz (1951) . For these reasons, there is still much research needed on fully delineating rational choice in environments where ambiguity is a feature of either preferences or information.
Radical uncertainty
The econometric and decision-theoretic advances I have described all presuppose the ability to assign payoffs under alternative models of the economy. As such, this presupposes a certain degree of forecastability of the effects of a policy given a model in the sense that given a model, one can compute expected payoffs. The calculation of model-specific expected payoffs is itself laden with assumptions. What I will refer to as "radical uncertainty" calls into question the utility of models themselves, at least for the sorts of quantitative policy comparisons I wish to make. Thus the critiques I raise in this section are such that my earlier focus on developments in econometrics and decision theory are inadequate.
One objection to the methods I have described is that in some contexts, a will reduce the technology frontier. In turn it may be possible to characterizing the welfare consequences of these losses under assumptions that do not require knowledge of the innovations themselves, but allow one to bound the consequences and invoke some of the decision theory I have described. To be fair, this is a conjecture.
A second reason why knowledge of payoffs may be unavailable for alternative economic models is that the models are too complicated to permit such calculations.
This argument is usually associated with Hayek; his (1964) paper is a good example of his views. Gaus (2007) has recently taken up this idea and developed a general defense of principled versus expedient (by which Gaus means consequentialistjustified) policies. In particular, he argues that the track record of economists in forecasting the effects of policies is sufficiently poor that expected payoff comparisons are an untenable basis for policy evaluation. Gaus (2007, p. 158) specifically claims that The crux of complexity theory is that our predictions about what will occur are likely to be wrong. There is, then, a very strong case that our interventions are not apt to be expedient because we have radically incomplete knowledge.
I regard this claim as stronger than the one illustrated by the technology example in the sense that Gaus-Hayek would argue that one cannot differentiate the supports of the outcomes generated by different policies even if one conditions on a given model, since each model worthy of consideration should be complex; their argument applies a fortiori to probabilities associated with the outcomes.
The Hayek-Gaus critique is, in my view, the most compelling case that current formal empirical economic methods do not provide a strong basis for "expert" policy evaluation. In essence, their critique argues that expert knowledge is so delimited that policy effects cannot be compared, even in a probabilistic sense. I challenge aspects of this position in Durlauf (2010) . My challenge makes several arguments. First, I question whether the inability to forecast policy changes is as evident as is assumed in the Hayek-Gaus perspective. I argue both that empirical economics is more successful than Gaus assumes and that complex systems, because they exhibit emergent properties, are amenable to some prediction.
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While I obviously believe these arguments, they do not invalidate the GausHayek critique. I in fact believe that environments with radical uncertainty should be the next frontier in work in decision theory. As an example, emergent properties of complex systems are often universal, which means that they arise for many specifications of the For example, there are a number of models of ferromagnetism, each of which has the property that heating a magnetized piece of iron sufficiently will eliminate the emergent property of magnetism for the many atoms that collectively comprise the piece of iron. interaction structure of the system; this is the sense in which I argued that predictability of emergent properties is possible 11 .
Thus to my mind, a key question for consequentialist policy evaluation in complex environments is whether policies that exploit universal properties can be justified in terms of the social welfare objectives of a policymaker. As far as I know, this question has yet to be explored.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have attempted to illustrate how economists have tried to come to grips with the limits to knowledge that should be respected in providing policy evaluations. Using model uncertainty as the basis for interpreting these limits, I have delineated how different variations on this uncertainty can be constructively addressed using econometric and decision theoretic methods. I have also argued that there are forms of radical uncertainty that have yet to be fully addressed.
Relative to Austrian critiques of formal empirical methods, my view is (unsurprisingly) that these critiques should be assessed against the background of the new econometric and decision theoretic work I have described. For example, von
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As a concrete example, the conditions for multiple equilibria in the discrete choice model of Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) hold both the case in which the payoff to each individual is affected by the expected average behavior of his neighbors and for the case where the payoff is only affected by his nearest neighbors. It is straightforward to demonstrate that this will be so for any payoff structure that depends on an unweighted average of the expected choices of others in the population. The Brock and Durlauf example of universality, however, presupposes that each agent faces the same private expected value to the payoff. When heterogeneity is introduced in the private expected payoffs, then their strong form of universality will no longer hold, although weaker forms may exist depending on the distribution of the expected private payoffs. The characterization of universality properties in models with rich forms of heterogeneity is an outstanding research question in economics and is in fact part of the frontier in mathematics. Spin glass models are a class of complex systems which incorporate heterogeneity across elements of a system that is analogous to heterogeneity in private payoffs; Fischer and Hertz (1993) and Hertz, Krogh, and Palmer (1990) are accessible introductions to these models. Relative to this paper, the import of this admittedly cursory discussion is that universality is not a panacea, since its presence does require certain restrictions on the economic environment under study.
Mises' remarks about the extrapolability of evidence from his hypothetical Atlantis to other contexts which is quoted earlier, is clearly rhetorical. The appropriate analytical question is how to account for exchangeability violations when extrapolating the effects of a policy change from one time and place to another. If each time and place is described by a different model or a different set of parameters, then von Mises skepticism may be justified; but this level of exchangeability failure is itself an assumption and one that does not (as far as I am aware) have any empirical basis. On the other hand, as illustrated in Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) , some forms of exchangeability can be modeled and hence incorporated into elements of a model
space. Yet that paper may be criticized for taking an inappropriately narrow view of the sources of exchangeability failures in its study of the effects of trade openness on growth. At a minimum, the von Mises critique requires argumentation as to why nothing of policy relevance can be learned from empirical work, just as an application of model averaging approaches requires argumentation that the model space properly accounts for exchangeability uncertainty. This is exactly the sort of material from which fruitful debates between different schools of thought can be produced.
